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Tort law remains the most exciting and challenging area of 
private law to teach and practice . Tort law reflects. sometimes ele- 
gantly. often crudely. the evolving standards of civil conduct . New 
York courts last year were. as usual. confronted with litigants seek- 
ing to broaden the scope of duty and expand the range of damages . 
Most decisions conservatively preserved the legal status quo. some 
ventured forth intellectually . Most of the decisions were sound. but 
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a few cases were wrongly decided. 
Medical malpractice actions continue to occupy much court 
time. Although there is no evidence to support the oft-voiced fears 
of medical society spokespersons that a crisis again looms in New 
York, many cases require reexamination of negligence doctrines as 
applied in these often complex cases. 
A. Informed Consent 
The informed consent doctrine in New York is codified.' The 
standard employed is one of reasonableness; the actions of both 
patient and physician are measured by what the reasonable person 
would have concluded in the circumstance presented? 
Lipsius v. Whites presents the typical intermeshing of a cause 
of action asserting lack of informed consent with an action for mal- 
practice, in that an unnecessary procedure was allegedly per- 
formed.' The trial court, on the defendant's motion, dismissed the 
plaintiffs complaint by ignoring both the quality and the quantity 
of the plaintiffs allegations that she had suffered injuries because 
of the severing of a nerve in her right hand by the defendant. The 
court rejected clear factual allegations that she was never informed 
of the risks and alternatives to the hand surgery.Vhe plaintiff 
also had the benefit of a unanimous panel finding of malpracticed 
and expert testimony to buttress her medical malpractice claim.' 
It is hard to view Lipsius as anything other than a correction 
of a trial court decision that far exceeded law and judicial discre- 
tion in rendering a verdict for the defendant doctor. It is regretta- 
1. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 3 2805-d ( M c K i e y  1977). New York codified the in- 
formed consent doctrine in the hope that its courts would be more restricted in their devel- 
opment of this doctrine than sister jurisdictions following a common-law course. 
2. See id. 8 2805-d(l), (3). 
3. 91 A.D.2d 271, 458 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1983). 
4. Id. a t  272, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t  930. 
5. Id. a t  276, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t  932. 
6. Id. a t  278,458 N.Y.S.2d a t  933. The panel was convened pursuant to N.Y. JUD. LAW 
8 148-a (McKinney 1983) and in this case, unlike many others, had little di5culty finding 
improper and negligent actions by the defendant. It is ironic that a panel system which 
seldom works properly suffered reversal by a trial judge in a case so obviously presenting 
evidence of malpractice. 
7. 91 A.D.2d a t  279, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t  934. 
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ble that the appellate division did not couch its reversal in strong 
words of censure of the trial court. 
Few specific problems in malpractice law trouble physicians 
more than the string of tragic cases arising out of the administra- 
tion of oxygen to babies in the early 1950's. Blindness resulted in a 
number of instances and very large verdicts have been awarded to 
the victims, now young adults. As a Washington state court noted, 
physicians face enormous damages often after having tried "to 
steer their tiny patients between the Scylla of blindness and the 
Charybdis of brain damage."s In Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hos- 
the First Department reversed the trial court on the issue of 
damage. The court's discussion of informed consent is interesting 
because the court affirmed the finding of liability on a broader con- 
cept of informed consent than the current codified version.1° Be- 
cause the procedure in question, the administration of oxygen to 
premature infants, was in a "gray area," in regard to risks, when 
the plaintiff was blinded by oxygen therapy, the court clearly sus- 
tained the concept of informed consent even when the alternative 
for the parents was the possible death of their newborn. 
The court's acknowledgment that "[iln the summer of 1953 a 
significant segment of the medical community continued to believe 
that the liberal administration of oxygen to prematures was impor- 
tant in preventing death or brain damage"" underscores the vital- 
ity of the informed consent doctrine for establishing liability. With 
authorities almost equally divided as to when the procedure in 
question became medically unnecessary or too risky to employ rou- 
tinely, informed consent emerges as the liability theory of choice. 
It is apparent that parents of infants blinded by oxygen adminis- 
tration were not properly informed, even by the doctrinal stan- 
dards of thirty years ago.'* 
8. May v. Dafore, 25 Wash. App. 5 7 5 , ,  611 P.2d 1275, 1276 (1980). 
9. 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1982). 
10. See id. a t  225-26, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t  881. 
11. Id. a t  218, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t  887. 
12. The specific medical issue in Burton will disappear from the litigation scene when 
all plaintiffs' claims are disposed of. The lesson remaining is that developing medical proce- 
dures will always create a period of doubt and possible subsequent disavowal. Plaintiffs 
seeking to rely upon malpractice theories will face the problem of establishing when a prac- 
tice was no longer deemed generally acceptable. Thii type of case often creates jury sympa- 
thy both for the defendant doctor and the institutional defendant. When adequate facts 
indicate a lack of informed consent, this should be the cause of action most vigorously pur- 
sued by plaintiffs' counsel. 
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An area of duty continuing to develop is that owed to the un- 
born by a physician. In a case of first instance in the appellate 
courts, Hughson v. St. Francis Hospital,18 the Second Department 
sustained the viability of a cause of action for prenatal injuries 
that allegedly occurred because informed consent was not properly 
obtained from the pregnant patient.14 The Hughson court correctly 
distinguished the plaintiffs cause of action from those previously 
brought under the concept of "wrongful life."16 In Hughson "the 
infant at  bar was an identifiable being within the zone of danger at  
the time of the wrongful act. Thus, this case would appear to fall 
squarely within the general rule that a surviving chid has a right 
to recover for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries."16 
Hughson is a logical and necessary extension of the doctrine 
that physicians owe a duty to those unborn children who enter the 
world injured due to the physician's negligent care of the mother. 
A child cannot give informed consent and, of course, an infant in 
utero is totally dependent on its mother's actions for its health and 
safety. Justice Weinstein, in Hughson, cogently established that 
the duty concept, based on informed consent, extends to the un- 
born.17 This extension of duty should not significantly burden phy- 
sicians because good medical practice dictates that therapy consid- 
erations include weighing effects on fetuses. 
B. Psychiatry 
Psychiatric malpractice actions require factfinding that is 
qualitatively different from that in most medical negligence cases. 
In Bell v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,18 a jury ver- 
dict for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Second Department. The 
13. 92 A.D.2d 131, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (2d Dep't 1983). 
14. Unfortunately, the facts underlying this action were inadvertently pleaded and thus 
the nature of the plaintiff's injury could not be reported. The appellate division decided the 
appeal on the purely legal issues raised. In the world of medical malpractice, it would have 
been useful to know the clinical background of this action, but this presumably may emerge 
in subsequent proceedings in this lawsuit. 
15. The theory that being born, of itself, can be a legally recognized wrong for which a 
remedy, presumably limited to money damages, can be fashioned, has been rejected in New 
York. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 886 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); 
accord Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269,429 N.E.2d 786,445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981). 
16. 92 A.D.2d a t  132, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16 (citation omitted). 
17. See id. at  133, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 816. 
18. 90 A.D.2d 270,456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1982). 
Heinonline - -  35 Syracuse L. Rev. 654 1984 
19841 Torts 655 
plaintiff attempted suicide after being released from Kings County 
Hospital. The hospital had treated the plaintiff, who had a long 
history of psychopathology, for schizophrenia and had released the 
plaintiff despite evidence of suicidal ideation and psychotic 
thought content. The usual battle between expert witnesses was 
played; the plaintiffs psychiatric authority asserted that the plain- 
tiffs release precipitated the suicide attempt and the defendant's 
expert maintained that the plaintiffs wife triggered his attempt at  
self-destruction.le 
Because most psychiatric malpractice cases raise questions of 
judgmental error, which are difficult to resolve, standards for lia- 
bility must be clearly articulated. The Bell court correctly and suc- 
cinctly delineated the negligence elements that favored the plain- 
tiffs claim: the inadequacy of the psychiatric examination and the 
psychiatrist's admission of departure from good medical practice. 
An inadequate record also contributed to the structuring of a pic- 
ture of negligence.%O 
C. The Panel Problem 
The medical malpractice panels remain a problem. Designed 
to winnow out cases devoid of merit and to encourage settlement 
of justified claims, the panels have increasingly become the subject 
matter of court motions and disputes. As one trial justice recently 
noted, "[elxperience has shown [the panel system] to be a costly 
failure. . . . ,321 
The question of physicians' impartiality on a panel was raised 
in several cases. The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, held that 
an anesthesiologist was disqualified because of his affiliation with 
19. Id. a t  277-78, 456 N.Y.S.2d a t  792. 
20. See id. a t  282,456 N.Y.S.2d a t  795. The absence of proper documentation remains 
an Achilles' heel for defendant physicians and hospitals. In a psychiatric case, where the 
observation and evaluation of behavior is usually the central issue, the failure to record and 
document observations remains potentially fatal for defendants. Bell reasserts this reality 
which attorneys for psychiatrista and hospitals should repeatedly bring to the attention of 
their clients. 
21. Stone v. Buffalo Gen. Hoap., 117 Misc. 2d 889,890,459 N.Y.S.2d 394,395 (Sup. Ct., 
Erie Co. 1983). The court granted motions to dispense with the panel, accepting movants' 
contention that only factual issues were disputed and that panel submission was unneces- 
sary and time-consuming. WhiIe interpreting the Judiciary Law to permit dispensing with 
the panel, Justice Bayser clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the panel system. See id. 
(construing N.Y. JUD. LAW 8 148-a(1) (McKinney 1983)). 
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the defendant hospital.22 The problem highlighted by this case is 
that in most malpractice actions outside major urban centers the 
designated panelist may well be affected, in one manner or an- 
other, by a relationship with the ~ar t ies .2~ 
The issue of bias arose when a law firm that was currently rep- 
resenting a panelist member in a separate matter also represented 
a physician appearing before that medical panel.%' In this action, 
not only was the panelist disqualified, but it was necessary to va- 
cate the findings of two panels to insure impartiality.e6 The proce- 
dure resulted in a waste of time and money for all. Because rela- 
tively few lawyers handle much of the medical malpractice defense 
work, similar conflicts will arise regularly. The writer suggests that 
the panel system as presently constituted should be abandoned 
due to a host of deficiencies proven by experien~e.~~ 
D. Other Malpractice Issues 
A medical malpractice trial is complicated and judicial deco- 
rum is of great importance. The Second Department recognized 
this and reversed for a new trial, vacating jury verdicts for the 
plaintiff, in Lopez v. Linden General H o ~ p i t a l . ~ ~  The court found 
that the trial judge "routinely interrupted counsel to question the 
witnesses in a manner that was at  times facetious, at other times 
pedantic . . . . The gratuitous nature of these intrusions . . . de- 
prived the municipal appellants of a fair trial."28 Shame on the 
trial court. 
22. See King v. Retz, 115 Misc. 2d 836, 454 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 
1982). 
23. The designated panelist in King practiced in the same department as several of the 
defendants. If he found that the questioned procedure indicated malpractice, he might be 
acting against his own prior medical judgment in similar cases. Id. a t  842-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d 
a t  598-99. 
24. See Scott v. Brooklyn Hosp., 93 A.D.2d 577, 462 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1983). 
25. See id. a t  581-82, 462 N.Y.S.2d a t  275. 
26. It is not suggested that alternatives to full-blown trials are not desirable. The goals 
of the State, as expressed in the Judiciary Law, see N.Y. JUD. LAW $ 148-a (McKinney 
1983), can be met by a corps of full-time physicians who could successfully provide what ad 
hoc panel membership fails to achieve-equitable and unbiased medical opinions. With a 
surfeit of physicians looming as a probability and with older doctors relu&t to practice 
part-time because of malpractice premium rates, a full-time staff of medical specialists 
would likely be both workable and economical. 
27. 89 A.D.2d 1010,454 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 1982) (mem.). 
28. Id. a t  1010-11, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 453. 
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A. State and Municipal Entities 
The Court of Appeals, in a short and well-reasoned opinion, 
abolished the fellow-servant rule in Buckley v. City of New Y ~ r k . ~ ~  
Recognizing that "[tlhe theoretical underpinnings of this rule have, 
to a large extent, been discredited in recent years,"s0 the Court an- 
alyzed the current operation of the rule and found that it worked 
to the disadvantage of municipal employees who, in many in- 
stances, are denied recourse to workers'   om pens at ion.^' 
An especially interesting municipal tort duty issue was de- 
cided in DeLong v. County of Erie.32 This case involved negligence 
in dispatching police assistance to a woman who had called the 911 
emergency number to report an attempted burglary. The 911 oper- 
ator failed to obtain proper information from the caller and the 
wrong police department was therefore dispatched to a nonexistent 
address in its area. Subsequently, the woman calling for help was 
sexually assaulted and mortally stabbed.ss Sustaining an award of 
$600,000, the aipellate court found the defendants, Erie County 
and the City of Buffalo, to be equally liable." The court created a 
duty to provide nonnegligent emergency services to persons using 
the 911 number. 
The providing, or the lack of providing, of police services has 
been a fertile ground for negligence actions in New York. For ex- 
ample, the Court of Appeals, through two key cases, has recognized 
that liability does not attach to a specific refusal to furnish protec- 
29. 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982). 
30. Id. at 303, 437 N.E.2d a t  1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 332. 
31. Although the rule was abolished entirely, the largest group that had been affected 
by its existence were police officers and firefighters. The rule has been a constant source of 
unhappiness to members of these high-risk occupations. For firefighters especially, injuries 
a t  the hands of negligent fellow-servants, without any other attributable negligent conduct, 
are frequent. Municipal governments will face increased liability exposure because of the 
rule's extinction but this problem could not justify retention of a nineteenth-century con- 
cept. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals, which has demonstrated both its reluctance to 
actively advance common-law duties and its preference for legislative action, pointedly em- 
phasized the decisional law ancestry of the fellow-servant rule. See id. a t  304,437 N.E.2d a t  
1089-90, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t  333. 
32. 89 A.D.2d 376,455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't 1982), afd, 60 N.Y.2d 296,457 N.E.2d 
717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983). 
33. 89 A.D.2d a t  379, 455 N.Y.S.2d a t  889. 
34. See id. at 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 888. 
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tion based on police evaluation of the request,36 although failure to 
protect a threatened citizen publicly identified with helping the 
police is t o r t i o u ~ . ~ ~  The 911 system has further expanded the range 
of police response capabilities while providing local government 
with larger, centralized facilities for processing emergency calls. 
It is common knowledge in New York, however, that two diffi- 
culties exist with the 911 system: 911 operators must process out 
nonemergency calls and the operators are not usually police of- 
ficers. Thus, discretion and competence are required of personnel 
who often lack relevant experience and sufficient training. DeLong 
clearly warns local governments that they are accountable if they 
either fail to establish reasonable procedures for the 911 apparatus 
or if such procedures are ignored or overlooked. The harsh reality 
recognized by the DeLong court is that "without the critical mis- 
takes in handling the initial transmission and the subsequent fail- 
ure to conduct a follow-up, a Village of Kenmore police car would 
have arrived in time to prevent the attack or to stop the intruder 
before he could inflict the final fatal wound to the neck."s7 
Two Court of Appeals decisions worthy of brief note involving 
local government are Garrett u. Holiday Inns, and Kush v. 
City of Buffalo.3s The codefendant in Garrett, the Town of Greece, 
was found not only to have permitted blatant violations of its 
building and fire laws, but to have knowingly issued a false certifi- 
35. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 
(1968). Linda Riss was threatened with harm by the boyfriend she wished to leave, an attor- 
ney. The police failed to protect her and she was almost totally blinded by a thug hired by 
the boyfriend. While the writer agrees with the rule announced in Riss, the facts of the case 
are narrower than the rule it  created. Rim provided the police with very specific information 
about threats made to her, see id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899, which 
should have been sufficient to require police protection. 
36. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 
(1958). Arnold Schuster spotted wanted bank robber Willy Sutton on a subway train. His 
information led to Sutton's apprehension and Schuster's murder on a Brooklyn street. 
Schuster was decided on a public policy basis; a citizen aiding police in the arrest of a 
wanted person established a right to be protected from individuals or groups taking a nega- 
tive view of the citizen's action. See id. a t  86, 154 N.E.2d at 540, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 274. 
37. 89 A.D.2d a t  385,455 N.Y.S.2d a t  892. The issue of the decedent's culpable conduct 
was never raised. She gave her address as "319 Victoria" without indicating Avenue or 
Boulevard. See id. at 378,455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. It  is clear from the court's opinion that the 
advertising and publicity given to the 911 number was sufficient to place the full onus for 
failiig to get a correct address on the police. 
38. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983). 
39. 59 N.Y.2d 26,449 N.E.2d 725,462 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1983). 
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cate of occupancy.40 The appellant, third-party plaintiffs, advanced 
both contribution and indemnification theories against the Town. 
The Court of Appeals found that contribution may be imposed 
against the municipal corporation. Although the Town owed no 
duty to the actual fire victims with regard to the inspection of the 
motel and the issuance of permits and certificates, a duty to own- 
ers and developers to share the cost of joint tortious activity ex- 
ists." Indemnity was properly found by the Court of Appeals to be 
inappropriate because no allegations were made that the Town was 
solely liable on a vicarious liability theory for the fire and subse- 
quent injuries.'% 
The issue of proportionate tort liability for local government is 
well-raised by Garrett, with a clear analysis provided by the Court 
of Appeals. It is important to note that mere negligence in execut- 
ing governmental duties will not expose a local government to lia- 
bility through contributi~n.'~ In Garrett the defendant Town ei- 
ther deliberately, indeed criminally, colluded with builders or 
operators of the motel or the Town was grossly negligent in its in- 
spection and certification procedure. In all likelihood, the former 
reason explains the events leading to the fatal fire. 
If, as is alleged in the complaints, known, blatant, and dangerous 
violations existed on these premises, but the town affirmatively 
certified the premises as safe, upon which representation appel- 
lants justifiably relied in their dealings with the premises, then a 
proper basis for imposing liability on the town may well have 
been demonstrated." 
In effect, the Town of Greece was found liable for an intentional 
tort. The tort in question, if committed by and charged against an 
individual, would, in all probability, have constituted a crime. The 
Court's holding does not significantly expand local government tort 
liability because, hopefully, the type of municipal behavior dis- 
closed by Garrett is a rarity. Certainly the decision must force re- 
sponsible local government administrators to ensure a high level of 
code and ordinance compliance. 
The dissent in Garrett is worthy of brief comment. Judge 
40. See 58 N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778. 
41. See id. at 261-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. 
42. See id. at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. 
43. See id. at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721,460 N.Y.S.2d at 778. 
44. Id. (citations and footnote omitted). 
Heinonline - -  35 Syracuse L. Rev. 659 1984 
660 Syracuse Law Review [vol. 35:651 
Jasen argued that Garrett was factually indistinguishable from 
prior Court of Appeals' decisions holding that no liability attaches 
to a town for breaching a general rather than a special duty. Citing 
Sanchez v. Village of Libert~, '~ in which public assistance recipi- 
ents were moved into a falsely certified building which subse- 
quently burned, Judge Jasen maintained that the Sanchez find- 
ing-no special municipal duty to the victims-precluded the 
outcome in G~rret t . '~  
The writer suggests that Judge Jasen reversed the basis for 
proper analysis. Garrett was correctly decided; Sanchez was not. 
Seen retrospectively, the element of reliance raised in Garrett for 
developers and investors was even greater in Sanchez. This also 
means, of course, that the fire victims themselves should have been 
able to plead a special duty to themselves running from the Town. 
There is a major difference between the traditional doctrine of no 
general duty running from local government to potential victims of 
governmental negligence and the hopefully emerging concept of a 
municipal entity being held liable for any harm directly flowing 
from conscious, and usually corrupt, wrongdoing. 
In the second case, Kush v. City of Buffalo," the Court of Ap- 
peals confronted the duty issue with regard to injuries sustained by 
a child finding chemicals taken from a public school and then 
abandoned. The defendant school maintained chemicals for in- 
structional purposes. Two student-employees, perhaps interested 
in conducting unauthorized experiments off the school premises, 
took a quantity of chemicals and hid them behind a bush where 
the eight-year-old plaintiff found the items. The explosion of the 
chemicals burned the boy. 
The duty found in this case is not one of general supervision 
because, under that theory, liability for harm done by students to 
others is usually not found against a s~hool.'~ Here the school 
maintained dangerous chemicals and the duty imposed is to rea- 
45. 42 N.Y.2d 876,366 N.E.2d 870,397 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1970), appeal dismissed on other 
grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 817,377 N.E.2d 748,406 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978); see also Quinn v. Nadler 
Bros., 92 A.D.2d 1013,461 N.Y.S.2d 455 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem.). 
46. See 58 N.Y.2d at 265-66, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81 (Jasen, J., 
dissenting). 
47. 59 N.Y.2d 26, 449 N.E.2d 725,462 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1983). 
48. See Hoose v. Drumm, 281 N.Y. 54, 22 N.E.2d 233 (1939); Kosok v. Young Men's 
Christian Ass'n, 24 A.D.2d 113, 264 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1st Dep't 1965), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 
935, 228 N.E.2d 398, 281 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1967). 
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sonably ensure that the chemicals are properly safeguarded. 
The Court of Appeals in Kush rejected the defendant's claim 
that the act of the student-employees in stealing the chemicals was 
beyond the scope of employment. As the Court noted, the 
"[dlefendant's duty in this case is not predicated on its status as 
an employer. Rather, the control and supervision of school-aged 
children present within the building, whether as students or em- 
ployees, is an essential part of defendant's duty to secure danger- 
ous chemicals from the children's access."49 The Court had little 
difficulty disposing of the intervening act defense, noting: 
Defendant's duty was to take reasonable steps to secure the dan- 
gerous chemicals from unsupervised access by children. By its 
very definition, any breach of this duty that leads to injury will 
involve an intentional, unauthorized taking of chemicals by a 
child. When the intervening, intentional act of another is itself 
the foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defend- 
ant who fails to guard against such conduct will not be relieved of 
liability when that act occurs!O 
Schools thaipurchase and store hazardous materials must also 
bear the responsibility for ensuring that injuries do not result from 
the activity. Although grounded in negligence, Kush really an- 
nounces a standard closer to strict liability because access to chem- 
icals by students, and the likelihood of small amounts being stolen 
by them, are both difficult, if not impossible, factors to control. 
Compensation of over one and one-half million dollars was 
awarded to a paid fireman for permanent injuries sustained be- 
cause of the explosion of a military weapon at  a training ~ession.~' 
The Court of Claims found that the fireman, while a t  a state-sup- 
ported county fire training center, was exposed to a white phos- 
phorus antipersonnel grenade instead of the anticipated smoke 
bomb.&* The court correctly found the State to be solely liable for 
what should have been denominated gross negligence. Although 
the State pled contributory negligence, the court disposed of this 
defense. 
The claimant had a right to rely on [the state instructor's] repre- 
49. 59 N.Y.2d at 32, 449 N.E.2d at 728,462 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (footnote omitted). 
50. Id. at 33, 449 N.E.2d at 729, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
51. See Talbone v. State, 116 Misc. 2d 864, 456 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. C1. 1982). 
52. See id. at 865, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
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sentation that the device was a smoke bomb unless he knew or 
should have known otherwise. This was not established, since the 
only evidence of his possession of the device was in a darkened 
area outside the training facility. In addition, the claimant's fail- 
ure to throw the grenade cannot be assigned as a cause, for he 
was acting under the reasonable belief that it was a smoke bomb 
and, hence, was harmless. Lastly, the claimant's failure to wear 
protective clothing cannot be considered a contributing factor, for 
there was no proof that had he done so, his injuries would have 
been any less severe.ag 
In Ammirati v. New York City Transit A ~ t h o r i t y , ~ ~  the Su- 
preme Court, Kings County, dismissed a claim against the Transit 
Authority alleging a failure to prevent or protect a passenger from 
injury by a thrown rock. The court correctly identified the grava- 
men of the complaint as an attack on governmental discretion to 
allocate police and other security resources rather than the articu- 
lation of a specific duty owed to the plaintiff.66 This type of com- 
plaint seems to be filed by victims of crime with increasing fre- 
quency. As there is no sign that the Court of Appeals is 
considering adopting a wider concept of duty in this area, most of 
this litigation is wasteful and unproductive. 
B. General 
The area of infliction of mental distress was highlighted again 
this past year. The most interesting case, while not strictly sound- 
ing in negligence, was Garland v. Herrin,66 a diversity action. Gar- 
land was the civil sequel to a nationally publicized murder case.67 
53. Id. a t  869, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 955. 
54. 117 Misc. 2d 213, 457 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1983). 
55. See id. at 215, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  740. 
56. 554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Subsequent to the writing of this Survey article, 
the Second Circuit reversed the district court. See Garland v. Herrin, No. 1341 (2d Cir. Dec. 
8,1983). The Second Circuit found that the district court's analysis was an extension rather 
than an application of New York law and was unsustainable. As a result of the Second 
Circuit's widely publicized reversal, several New York legislators have announced plans to 
introduce bills to create private causes of action in situations similar to Garland. 
57. Richard Herrin and Bonnie Garland were lovers. When Garland sought to end the 
relationship, Herrin became despondent. In July 1977, Garland discussed her relationship 
with Herrin in her bedroom and indicated, according to Herrin, that she wished to date 
other men. The only thing definitively known to have followed this conversation was Her- 
rin's bludgeoning of Garland with a hammer. Herrin subsequently told police of his act and 
a local officer went to the Garland home and asked the unaware Mrs. Garland to take him to 
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The victim's parents brought this action on principle rather than 
as a serious quest for money damages from a prison inmate.68 Ap- 
plying New York law, District Court Judge Griesa found that the 
murderous and brutal assault on the victim in her own bedroom 
constituted a reckless infliction of mental distress on both parents, 
even though neither parent witnessed the attack and only the 
mother discovered her dying daughter in the home.6s The husband 
first saw his daughter at  the hospital. 
Although not binding, of course, on New York courts, the dis- 
trict court opinion is disturbing. New York, through two key cases, 
had previously recognized both a cause of action for mental dis- 
tress unconnected to physical injurye0 and the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental distres~.~' In both cases the harm was both 
foreseeable and direct. No New York case has accepted the doc- 
trine of liability for mental harm to persons not witnessing the 
commission of a crime or tort, but merely viewing the aftermath in 
the form of the victim. The district court gratuitously stated that 
"there is no reason to believe that the New York Court of Appeals 
would not also approve"62 the section of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts creating liability for emotional harm to third parties.6s A 
reasonable basis for believing that New York would not adopt that 
provision, for a judge sitting in a diversity action, is that it has not 
done so. 
Further, the Restatement section relied on by Judge Griesa re- 
quires the third person to witness the extreme or outrageous be- 
havior, not the aftermath.64 The Restatement was not, intended to 
the girl's bedroom, where the mother then discovered her battered and dying comatose 
daughter. The plaintiff father was notified by telephone and rushed to the hospital. Id. at  
311. 
58. Personal knowledge of the author. 
59. See 554 F. Supp. at  308. 
60. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). 
61. See Halio v. Laurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961). 
62. 554 F. Supp. at 313. 
63. Section 46 of the Restatement provides, in pertinent part: 
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person the actor is subject to liability 
if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, 
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or 
(b) to any other person who is present at  the time, if such distress results in W i l y  
harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
64. Section 46 provides that a family member must be "present at  the time." Id. 
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expand liability to compensate those who discover the victims of 
crime, such as Mrs. Garland, and even less so to compensate those 
summoned by telephone to the hospital. While a description of the 
murder of Bonnie Garland evokes horror, more so because of the 
mother's discovery of the dying girl, there is no basis in New York 
law to support this diversity-action verdict.66 No doubt others who 
suffer genuine emotional harm under like circumstances will at- 
tempt to have the New York courts follow Garland. Unless a new 
right is articulated, Garland provides no basis for such a theory of 
recovery. 
Several other cases deserve brief mention. Following accepted 
New York doctrine, the Second Department denied the existence 
of a cause of action predicated solely on the emotional distress of a 
mother witnessing her baby's death because of negligent medical 
care.66 A guest's complaint that being prematurely and negligently 
checked out of a hotel justified damages for emotional harm was 
dismissed under the theory of triviality?' Emotional distress, as 
the sole harm resulting from the delivery of a stillborn infant, al- 
legedly because of negligence, is not actionable without physical 
injuries?* Finally, mental distress resulting from the negligent re- 
pair of a car does not add up to a cause of action.69 It is fortunate 
that the court denied this cause of action or else the courts would 
truly have been unmanageably flooded by continually distressed 
motorists. 
C. Specific Problem Areas 
As always, persistent issues arose last year in both old and new 
forms. The question of infant liability for negligence was presented 
in the context of a car damaged by keys thrown by an eleven-year- 
65. The district court correctly noted that "both the New York courts and the drafters 
of the Restatement are concerned about the need to impose appropriate limits on liability 
for a somewhat intangible injury such as emotional distress." 554 F. Supp. a t  314. I t  is hard 
to know what limits can be raised when so often persons discover crime's dead or wounded 
victims. 
66. See Quijije v. Lutheran Medical Center, 92 A.D.2d 935,460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 
1983) (rnem.). 
67. See Pollock v. Holsa Corp., 114 Misc. 2d 1076,454 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. App. T., 
1st Dep't 1982). 
68. See Friedman v. Meyer, 90 A.D.2d 511,454 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1982) (mem.). 
69. See Ford v. Village Imports, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 717,461 N.Y.S.2d 108 (4th Dep't 1983) 
(rnem.). 
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old child.?O The child was engaged in a game with playmates. The 
court found that an eleven-year-old child was capable of following 
the reasonable standard of care demanded by the situation. The 
plaintiff failed, however, to have the court impose liability on the 
key-throwing child's parent under General Obligations Law section 
3-112.71 That statute creates liability when a child "willfully, mali- 
ciously or unlawfully" destroys pr0perty.7~ The court noted that 
the plaintiffs key to proving the parents' liability rested on show- 
ing a purpose on the child's part other than play. Because the facts 
tended to demonstrate that the negligent defendant was ~laying,?~ 
access to the "deep pocket" was denied. 
A second child-related case involved the theory of negligent 
entrustment." A motorist, sued for injuring a child on a 
skateboard, counterclaimed against the injured child's father. The 
appellate division dismissed the counterclaim on the sole finding 
that a skateboard is not a dangerous in~trument.?~ 
Few interesting gross negligence actions were decided during 
this Survey year, but Veals u. Consolidated Edison CO.?~ deserves 
brief mention. The plaintiff, characterized by the court as "a quiet 
but feisty professor of gerontology at  Columbia Uni~ersity,"~~ suf-
fered the loss of residential electrical service even though the de- 
fendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had paid all of his bills in 
a timely manner. The defendant clearly went its own bureaucratic 
way without reference to the facts or proper procedure. The civil 
court judge correctly concluded that such actions 
went far beyond mere negligence or carelessness. I find that the 
actions of Con Edison fit the test applicable for a finding of gross 
negligence. The striking fact here is that Con Edison admitted 
that the customer had paid his bill but proceeded to sever his 
70. See Deliio v. Cangialosi, 117 Misc. 2d 105,457 N.Y.S.2d 396 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings 
Co. 1983). 
71. See id. a t  107, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  398. 
72. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 3-112 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
73. See 117 Misc. 2d a t  107,457 N.Y.S.2d a t  398. 
74. The theory of negligent entrustment arises when a parent allows a minor to possess 
or operate dangerous instruments. See Nolechek v. Geauale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 
1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). The finding that an object is a dangerous instrument has 
been left to case adjudication. 
75. See Young v. Dalidowicz, 92 A.D.2d 242, 248,460 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (2d Dep't 1983). 
76. 114 Misc. 2d 626,452 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 1983). 
77. Id. a t  627, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t  154. 
Heinonline - -  35 Syracuse L .  Rev. 665 1984 
666 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 35:651 
utility service anyway despite this kno~ledge.'~ 
Allegations of gross negligence are appropriate in small claims ac- 
tions such as Veals and may, in fact, be the only effective deter- 
rent for incompetent public utilities and common carriers who 
rarely cause great special damages in nonpersonal injury cases. 
IV. STRICT LIABILITY 
A. Products Liability 
No major products liability cases were decided last year. An- 
nounced decisions reflected the continuation of past doctrine. Per- 
haps the most interesting discussion was Judge Fuchsberg's dissent 
in Gobhai v. KLM Royal Dutch  airline^.?^ The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, without opinion, the appellate division's dismissal of an 
action sounding in strict products liability. The plaintiff had re- 
ceived from her son a pair of slippers which the defendant airline 
had given him as part of its first-class trans-Atlantic service. The 
plaintiff fell and injured herself a t  home allegedly because the slip- 
pers, brand new when she removed them from their protective 
wrapper, were defective.s0 
Judge Fuchsberg cogently analyzed the prevailing confusion in 
New York law resulting from the sales-service dichotomy, a con- 
cept never rationally and finally delineated in case law, and criti- 
cized what he viewed as the majority's "inadmissibly narrow defi- 
nition of a sale."*' This issue recurs every year with no solution 
adequate to either guide counsel or protect injured parties yet in 
sight. Judge Fuchsberg also highlighted another perennial New 
York products liability issue. 
Preliminarily, I note that, though both courts below broadsweep- 
ingly referred to the action as though it were one in strict prod- 
ucts liability alone, the pleadings, as already indicated, also ex- 
pressly speak to breach of warranty and, arguably, if liberally 
construed, to negligence as well. This oversight is especially 
troublesome because, in this area of litigation, pleading (and sub- 
stantive) categorization has been so beset by a tendency to over- 
lap, that in the past we have thought it worthwhile to comment 
78. Id. at 629, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 155. 
79. 57 N.Y.2d 839, 442 N.E.2d 61, 455 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1982) (mem.). 
80. Id. at 842, 442 N.E.2d at 62,455 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66 (Fuchsberg, J., Tinting) .  
81. See id. at 841, 442 N.E.2d at 62,455 N.Y.S.2d at 765. 
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that "it may be open to a particular plaintiff to base his case on 
contract liability or negligence or strict products liability, or on 
some combination thereof."8e 
Although reflecting his own experience as a plaintiffs trial ad- 
vocate, Judge Fuchsberg's dissent points out some of the bother- 
some contradictions in New York's strict products liability law. 
The slippers in question here were part of the price of an airline 
ticket and were distributed as a distinct product for use during 
and after the journey. The plaintiff should have had her day in 
court on a product liability theory. 
Product-related tort cases often raise choice-of-law issues. In 
Bewers v. American Home Products Corp.,sS the defendants 
sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' action under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. The plaintiffs, three English couples, demanded 
recovery for injuries they believed were caused by using oral con- 
traceptives manufactured by the defendanLS4 The contraceptives 
were marketed, promoted, and distributed throughout the United 
Kingdom. 
The court, in denying the motions for dismissal, noted the 
grounds for analyzing forum non conveniens motions.86 In this 
case, the court found that dismissal would benefit the defendants 
by depriving the plaintiffs of their "strongest cause of action, . . . 
strict products liability."88 Further, the English statute of limita- 
tions might well be an absolute bar to bringing the action in the 
United K i n g d ~ m . ~ ~  Recognizing the burden carried by the plain- 
tiffs if dismissal was ordered, the court noted: 
Whether plaintiffs would have an adequate forum in England 
if their actions are dismissed in New York is uncertain, at  best. If 
these cases are conditionally dismissed and plaintiffs' attempt to 
bring them in England is rebuffed, they will then have to return 
here after significant delay and additional expense. This prospect 
imposes on defendants a somewhat heavier burden to show that 
New York is an inconvenient forum than they would bear if an 
82. Id. a t  843,442 N.E.2d a t  63,455 N.Y.S.2d a t  765 (quoting Victorson v. Bock Laun- 
dry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975)). 
83. 117 Misc. 2d 991, 459 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). 
84. Three different oral contraceptives were implicated in the harm claimed by the 
women plaintiffs. See id. a t  992-93, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t  668-69. 
85. See id. a t  994, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t  669. 
86. Id. a t  995, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t  670. 
87. Id. a t  996, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t  670. 
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adequate alternative forum were unambiguously available.88 
The convenience issue was also analyzed at length. An important 
argument accepted by the court for not dismissing this action was 
that 
[ulnlike the vast majority of tort cases in which forum non 
conveniens is an issue, the instant cases do not arise out of an 
accident, which can happen as readily in one place as another. 
The tortious acts here alleged involve calculation and decision, 
that is, intentional and deliberate conduct. This conduct, the 
making of defendants' relevant corporate decisions, is claimed, 
without contradiction, to have occurred not in England, but in 
New Y~rk .~ '  
Necessary proof, witnesses, and documents in all likelihood would 
be found more readily in New York than in London. 
The defendants argued that to dismiss the actions would show 
deference to British policy objectives, which do not include strict 
products liability as a cause of action.90 The defendants also wor- 
ried that the trial of this issue in New York would be an unwar- 
ranted act of paternalism towards the Mother Co~ntry.~' The 
court properly rejected these assertions as groundless. Reaching a 
key analytical point, the court held that 
[tlhe trend toward uniformity in products liability law, i.e., 
towards consumer protection and the rule of strict products lia- 
bility, suggests that the courts in this country should be less re- 
luctant to retain jurisdiction over transnational products liability 
litigation and certainly less reluctant to apply the forum's strict 
products liability law.9P 
American companies, doing business in and deriving profit 
from a New York base, should not be permitted to hide behind the 
often less rigorous laws of forums where injury occurs. Bewers is 
one of the most cogently analytical tort lawlchoice-of-law cases of 
recent memory. Transnational product liability cases will increase 
and Bewers provides a good framework for the choice-of-law di- 
lemmas sure to arise. As the court concluded: 
88. Id. at 997, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 671. 
89. Id. at 1000,459 N.Y.S.2d at 673. 
90. See id. at 1004, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 675. 
91. See id. at 1005, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 676. 
92. Id. at 1002, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 674. 
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On the major choice of law issue, New York law should be ap- 
plied. The complications of international products liability litiga- 
tion require sensible and easily applicable forum non conveniens 
and choice of law rules. New York is the headquarters or the 
principal place of business of many multinational corporations. It 
should not, however, be merely the center for corporate head- 
quarters but also the leader in developing laws to protect inno- 
cent persons from wrongful activities of such corporations, wher- 
ever they choose to conduct their operations. New York should 
not become the haven of marauding tort-fea~ors.~~ 
In other products liability actions it was held that strict liabil- 
ity should not apply to the destruction of business papers belong- 
ing to guests at  a hotel?' 
In yet another Dalkon Shield action, Lindsey v. A. H. Robins 
CO.,*~ the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the 
trial court for applying the wrong statute of limitations. The Sec- 
ond Department found that where an infection followed the im- 
plantation of a Dalkon Shield, the cause of action accrued with the 
injury, not at  the date of insertion?= Because much prior case law 
sets accrual of the cause of action at  the date a foreign object is 
introduced into the plaintws body, the court found it necessary to 
distinguish its decision from this prior case law. 
In sum we hold that an intrauterine device which facilitates 
infection is significantly different from dust, asbestos particles, a 
hazardous dye, or a thorium dioxide substance which directly and 
immediately act upon the body causing injury and that the date 
of onset of injury rather than the date of insertion is the accrual 
date to be used for computing the limitation of the time for 
bringing suit in this kind of ca~e .8~ 
The court's decision in Lindsey reflects the real differences be- 
tween pathogenic agents that immediately begin causing harm and 
93. Id. at 1010, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 678. 
94. See Arrow Elec., Inc. v. StoufTer Corp., 117 Mic. 2d 554, 458 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. 
Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). This case arose from the fatal StoufTer fire in Westchester that killed 26 
people. The court relied on the sales-service dichotomy-because there was no sale, there 
could be no strict producta liability action. 
95. 91 A.D.2d 150, 458 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2d Dep't 1983). The case was set to be argued 
before the Court of Appeals on Oct. 25,1983. See Court of Appeals Calendar, 190 N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 17, 1983, at 16, col. 2. 
96. 91 A.D.2d at 160, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 607-08. 
97. Id. 
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the defectively designed product that may or may not cause harm 
to the user. Applying the conventional accrual rule to a product 
like the Dalkon Shield would deprive its users of any measure of 
legal redress for the harm they might 
Continuing New York's line of concert of action products lia- 
bility cases was Centone v. Schmidt & Sons, I~C .~"  In Centone the 
plaintiff sued Schmidt & Sons for injuries caused by an exploding 
bottle. Schmidt & Sons then commenced a third-party action 
against five glass bottle manufacturers, its sole suppliers. The bot- 
tle could not be traced back to any specific manufacturer.loO 
Schmidt & Sons' problem was that it could not establish tortious 
conduct on the part of any of the manufacturers and really sought 
to rely on the rejected enterprise liability concept.lol The court de- 
nied the five third-party defendants' motion for summary judg- 
ment pending further discovery by Schmidt & Sons. It is most un- 
likely that Schmidt & Sons d uncover evidence of the requisite 
tortious conduct by the defendants or that the concert of action 
theory will be expanded to embrace enterprise liability. 
B. Dram Shop 
Two cases warranting brief notice were decided this past year 
concerning the Dram Shop Act.loa In Kohler v. Wray,lo8 the plain- 
tiff sought to expand the operation of the Dram Shop Act to in- 
clude social guests who contribute towards the cost of the alcoholic 
beverages.lM New York courts had previously limited the operation 
of the Act to sales situations and explicitly excluded social 
guests.lO% Kohler, the plaintiff was beaten up by a fellow guest 
98. A federal court arrived at a similar conclusion in a diversity action involving the 
same manufacturer. See Bailey v. A. H. Wins Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 833 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). 
The district court relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to strike down a defense that 
the plaintiffs action was time barred. 
99. 114 Misc. 2d 840,452 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1983). 
100. See id. a t  841,452 N.Y.S.2d a t  301. 
101. Id. a t  845,452 N.Y.S.2d a t  303; see Sidel l  v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 
607 P.2d 924,163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (enterprise liability theory could not be relied on by women 
plaintiffs seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for injuries sustained by administration 
of drug DES to their mothers during pregnancy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
102. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 8 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984). 
103. 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct., Steuben Co. 1982). 
104. See id. a t  858, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t  833. 
105. See, e.g., Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (2d Dep't 1976). The court sent what 
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who was served beer by the defendants. The plaintiff maintained 
that his five dollar contribution transformed the party situation 
and made the hosts sellers under the Dram Shop Act.lo6 This con- 
tention was rejected by the court, as Edgar dictated it must be.lo7 
A more complex problem was presented in Wright v. Sunset 
Recreation, Inc.lo8 PlaintSs decedent was killed by an allegedly 
drunken driver who had been served liquor, while intoxicated, in a 
bowling alley by waitresses from a tavern housed in the same 
building. The defendant owned the structure. The court found that 
no sale was made by the defendant and that the failure to allege 
such a sale was a fatal defect where liability under the Dram Shop 
Act was sought.loS The court rejected the plaintSs theory that a 
beneficial relationship existed between the defendant and the 
tavern.svc20,110] loS 
The writer believes that a quasi-sale by the defendant oc- 
curred which is within the Dram Shop Act. Here, both the tavern 
and the bowling alley shared a common forename, occupied the 
same quarters, and the bar's waitresses roamed through the bow- 
ling alley soliciting and filling orders. The defendant possibly as- 
sisted drunken bowlers in purchasing liquor from its tenant from 
whom it received, minimally at  least, rent. Possibly the defendant 
also received some other remuneration from the sale of alcohol by 
the tavern. The dismissal of the complaint precluded the plaintiff 
from adducing proof to show the defendant should be considered a 
seller under the Dram Shop Act and was, at  best, premature. 
A. Abusive Discharge 
The Court of Appeals decided in Murphy v. American Home 
Products Corp.ll1 that no cause of action for abusive discharge ex- 
ists in New York. Murphy is one of the most important decisions 
should have been a clear message in Edgar that the Dram Shop Act was to be narrowly 
construed. The sale of a beverage by a licensed business was a sine qua non for invoking the 
Act. Apparently the message was not received by all. 
106. See 114 Misc. 2d at 858,452 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
107. See id. 
108. 91 A.D.2d 701, 457 N.Y.S.2d 606 (3d Dep't 1982) (mem.). 
109. See id. at 701,457 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
110. See id. 
111. 58 N.Y.2d 293,448 N.E.2d 86,461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). 
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of the Court of Appeals this past year because it forecloses actions 
that other jurisdictions increasingly recognize. The plaintiff in 
Murphy alleged that he had been dismissed for "blowing the whis- 
tle" to top management about accounting irregularitiesll' and be- 
cause of his age.lls 
The Court of Appeals recognized the increasing acceptance of 
a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge. 
Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will 
rule appear to have been motivated by conclusions that the free- 
dom of contract underpinnings of the rule have become outdated, 
that individual employees in the modern work force do not have 
the bargaining power to negotiate security for the jobs on which 
they have grown to rely, and that the rule yields harsh results for 
those employees who do not enjoy the benefits of express contrac- 
tual limitations on the power of dismissal. Whether these conclu- 
sions are supportable or whether for other compelling reasons em- 
ployers should, as a matter of policy, be held liable to at-will 
employees discharged in circumstances for which no liability has 
existed at  common law, are issues better left to resolution a t  the 
hands of the Legislature. In addition to the fundamental question 
whether such liability should be recognized in New York, of no 
less practical importance is the definition of its configuration if it  
is to be recognized."' 
The Court also felt that the dislocation in expectations that would 
be created by an abusive discharge cause of action was too great to 
be supported solely by a decisional law basis."" with the re- 
peated attempts to have the Court of Appeals recognize a com- 
mon-law right of privacy, so too in this area, the Court indicated 
its desire to defer to the Legislature.l16 
The Court's fears about the disruption of stable expectations 
are, the writer believes, grossly exaggerated. Court-ordered rein- 
statement and back wages, as well as punitive damages, are already 
within the borders of New York law in sex, race, and religious bias 
112. See id. at 297-98, 448 N.E.2d at 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233. 
113. See id. at 298,448 N.E.2d at 87,461 N.Y.S.2d at 233. Plaintiff was over 50 yeam 
old. His age discrimination complaint was rejected by the appellate division as time-barred, 
but was reinstated by the Court of Appeals. See id. at 297,306-07,448 N.E.2d at 87,92,461 
N.Y.S.2d at 233, 238. 
114. Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236. 
115. See id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236. 
116. See id. 
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cases.l17 The perennial judicial fear that a new tort law duty will 
unleash an unacceptable horde of litigants has never materialized 
before; it would not now."s 
Regardless of the direction taken by sister states, it is within 
the power of the Court of Appeals to recognize the tort of abusive 
discharge. Employment is increasingly regarded as a property 
right, the deprivation of which should not occur for arbitrary or 
capricious reasons. An additional major policy reason for recogniz- 
ing a cause of action for abusive discharge lies in the reality that 
some employment terminations follow an employee's exposure of 
corrupt or illegal practices of the employer. The employee may, as 
in Murphy, reveal the problems internally, or resort may be had to 
the police, legislative bodies, or the media. The activity of whistle 
blowing, although certainly prone to abuse by disaffected employ- 
ees, should be supported by public policy through a cause of action 
for abusive discharge. In the critical field of environmental protec- 
tion, for example, society needs to be protected from illegal 
hazards, the revelation of which can often only come from employ- 
ees of violators. Because employment termination usually occurs 
after an employee reveals inforxation of improper or criminal ac- 
tivities, protection must be afforded to whistle blowers. 
Because of the political and economic interests involved, the 
writer is not sanguine over the likelihood of a legislatively created 
cause of action for abusive discharge. This is a matter with which 
the Court of Appeals can deal and the Court should have recog-' 
nized the common-law right sought by the plaintiff in Murphy. 
B. Privacy and Publicity 
In the absence of either a legislative or statutory general right 
of privacy, litigants in New York continue to depend, in many in- 
stances, on section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law."s In some 
117. See, e.g., Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N.Y.2d 72, 
79, 417 N.E.2d 525, 529, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231, 235 (1980) (religious bias); Batavia Lodge v. 
State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 146,316 N.E.2d 318, 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 
(1974) (racial bias); Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 56, 304 N.E.2d 231, 
233, 349 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366-67 (1973) (sex bias); N.Y. EXEC. LAW $3 296(1)(a), 297(4)(c)(iii) 
(McKinney 1982). 
118. For a refutation of the standard argument against extending duties, see Judge 
Meyer's dissent in Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d a t  314-16, 448 N.E.2d a t  97, 461 N.Y.S.2d a t  243 
(Meyer, J., dissenting). 
119. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW $ 51 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
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instances, resort to the Civil Rights Law is inappropriate, but this 
practice will continue as long as New York remains in the minority 
of states which do not recognize a right of privacy. 
The Court of Appeals in Welch v. Mr. Christmas Inc.120 af- 
firmed an award of both compensatory and exemplary damages to 
an actor whose commercial for the defendant was broadcast after 
the contract for its use expired.12' Although the commercial was 
aired by a distributor and not by the defendant, the defendant was 
liable because it  "had actively encouraged the maximum use of the 
commercial in order to sell Christmas trees and had placed no re- 
strictions on the use of the commercial by its distributors, and [its 
president] was sure that he had not received back all of the prints 
sent 
In another Court of Appeals decision, the Court refused to ap- 
ply section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law for the benefit of ac- 
tress Brooke Shields in a media-publicized a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  With her 
mother's consent, Shields had posed at  the age of ten for the de- 
fendant who now wished to publish the pictures. The plaintiff 
sought to enjoin photos of her frolicking nude in a bathtub.lP4 This 
action was complicated by the issue of the plaintifPs infant status 
a t  the time the contract was executed. The Court discussed the 
nature of child modeling careers and concluded that the parents 
enjoyed the right to enter into contracts which, under the Civil 
Rights Law, could not be disaffirmed by the model on attaining the 
age of majority.125 The Court noted that the photos in question 
were not pornographic, a factor apparently relevant in denying the 
plaintiff the injunctive relief sought.le6 
In dissent, Judge Jasen disagreed with the majority's applica- 
tion of section fifty-one, noting: 
The majority holds, as a matter of law, not only in this case 
but as to all present and future consents executed by parents on 
behalf of children pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil 
Rights Law, that once a parent consents to the invasion of pri- 
120. 57 N.Y.2d 143, 440 N.E.2d 1317, 454 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1982). 
121. See id. at 146, 440 N.E.2d at 1319, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 972. 
122. Id. at 146, 440 N.E.2d at 1319,454 N.Y.S.2d at 973. 
123. See Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1983). 
124. Id. at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109,461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. 
125. See id. at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257. 
126. See id. at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 
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vacy of a chid, the child is forever bound by that consent and 
may never disaffirm the continued invasion of his or her privacy, 
even where the continued invasion of the child's privacy may 
cause the child enormous embarrassment, distress and humil- 
iation.la7 
Judge Jasen's analysis recognized that section fifty-one should be 
interpreted to afford plaintiffs a right to prevent and enjoin ongo- 
ing commercial exploitation of their likenesses, based on prior pa- 
rental consent, after they become legal adults. It is clear, however, 
that section fifty-one was never intended to vitiate accepted doc- 
trines with regard to disavowal of contracts executed in infancy.12s 
Judge Jasen correctly recognized that the real issue in Shields 
was the protection of exploitable infants at  the point when they 
become legally competent to manage their own affairs. Section 
fifty-one should allow a person, obligated during infancy by con- 
tracts entered into by parents, to halt the commercial use of his or 
her name and to forego both the benefits and the costs involved in 
such use. As neither the text nor the legislative history of section 
fifty-one precludes such a possibility, the Court of Appeals decided 
Shields incorrectly. 
Allegations of violations of New York's limited right of privacy 
as codified in section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law are fre- 
quently countered by first amendment defenses. In Davis v. High 
Society Magazine, Inc.,lZ9 a famous female pugilist sought dam- 
ages for the publication of a photo, allegedly of her and naming her 
as the subject, showing her bare-breasted in a boxing ring. Revers- 
127. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
128. As Judge Jasen stated: 
Two factors distinguish sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law from those statu- 
tory provisions which do, in certain contexts, abolish the minor's right to disaffirm a 
contract. The first is that in all cases when the Legislature has intended to do so, 
they have made their intention clear by specific language which directly refers to 
the infant's common-law right. The absence of any reference in the Civil Rights 
Law to the minor's right to disaffirm a contract, especially when it is clear that the 
right to disaffirm was well established, indicates that the Legislature did not intend 
to affect that right. Secondly, unlike the other kinds of contracts which the Legisla- 
ture has designated as immune from the minor's right to disaffirm, it cannot be said 
that a contract releasing all rights to photographs or even limited rights to those 
pictures is necessarily beneficial to the infant. This is even more true when the 
pictures, as in this case, are of the variety which can be exploited in the future or 
used in publications of questionable taste. 
Id. at  351-52, 448 N.E.2d at 114-15, 461 N.Y.S.2d at  260-61. 
129. 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep't 1982). 
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ing the trial court, the Second Department found that the photo in 
question was used for news purposes and was also protected by the 
first amendment in the event that the photo complained of was not 
of the plaintiff, although she was identified as the subject.1a0 
Although the photo was not of the plaintiff, plaintiff was a 
well known female boxer and was, therefore, a limited purpose 
public figure. Plaintiff thus had the burden of proving actual mal- 
ice on the part of the publisher for being misrepresented in the 
photo caption. The court held that a substantial question of actual 
malice existed and denied the plaintiffs summary judgment 
motion.1s1 
In Delan v. CBS, Inc.,ls2 the f i s t  amendment again provided a 
defense against a section fifty-one claim. The plaintiff, a mentally 
ill patient in a state hospital, appeared for about four seconds in a 
nationally televised one hour telecast. He was clearly recogniza- 
blelSS and had signed a consent form.lS4 The Second Department, 
in reversing the trial court, found the news and public interest as- 
pects of the case to be controlling.lS6 
130. See id. at 383,457 N.Y.S.2d a t  315-16. According to the court, 
[i]t has long been recognized that use of a name or picture by the media in connec- 
tion with a newsworthy item is protected by the First Amendment and is not con- 
sidered a use for purposes of trade within the ambit of the Civil Rights Law . . . . 
This is true irrespective of the fact that such publications are carried on largely, 
and even primarily, to make a profit. More generally, it has been recognized that 
certain publications are of public interest and, therefore, protected, even if not 
strictly concerned with news or nonfictional material . . . . 
Id. at 379, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
131. See id. at 383-84, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  316. 
132. 91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1983). 
133. Id. at 256, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t  611. 
134. Id. a t  258, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t  612. The writer is troubled about the validity of this 
consent. Although only patients certified by one of the hospital's physicians as being capable 
of giving consent were allowed to actually consent, i t  is clear that hospital authorities were 
cooperating with the defendant. Without patients there would be no documentary. All the 
patients who signed consent forms suffered from one type or another of psychotic illness. No 
therapeutic reason for permitting the patients to participate in the filming was shown and 
there may well be none. Although there is a definite public value in showing what goes on 
inside mental hospitals, the writer feels the plaints  was exploited, perhaps for the best of 
motives, but exploited nonetheless. Because section 51 of the Civil Rights Law properly 
affords no relief here, i t  is suggested that legislative action is needed to protect confined 
psychiatric patients against the type of hospital discretion exercised in this case. 
135. See id. at 259,458 N.Y.S.2d at 613. The court stated: 
In our opinion, the documentary film with which this case is concerned dealt with a 
matter of legitimate public interest, i.e., the deinstitutionalization of mental pa- 
tients and their placement in an outpatient program designed to benefit both them- 
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C. Libel and Slander 
In Buckley v. Litman,lS8 the Court of Appeals dismissed the 
libel action of a physician's assistant against his former physician 
employer. The defendant, having suspected the plaintiff of tamper- 
ing with patient records and getting no satisfactory answer from 
the plaintiff, wrote to the appropriate licensure board. A carbon 
copy was sent to the county sheriff and to a physician who had just 
hired the plaintifT.lS7 The Court of Appeals found a qualified privi- 
lege attached to the challenged carbon copy mailing of the letter.lS8 
Without proof of malice the motion was dismissed. It is regrettable 
that dismissal was not granted by the trial court. As a matter of 
policy, in the very sensitive area of assuring competent health care, 
trial courts should be alert to nonmeritorious actions for libel. The 
qualified privilege must be applied a t  the earliest stage, when the 
facts clearly indicate its appropriateness, so that people with infor- 
mation about negligent or dishonest professionals will not be dis- 
couraged from taking action. That the defendant had to appeal the 
case to the highest court in New York to obtain a dismissal of the 
action highlights the reasons so often given by doctors and hospital 
administrators for not reducing critical observations to writing.lSB 
The Second Department, in Park Knoll Associates u. 
Schmidt,140 decided an important libel case of first impression. 
The leader of a tenants' association drafted and mailed a letter to 
the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal 
selves and society as a whole. I t  involved a critical review of the mental hygiene 
program in this State as a matter of general and public concern, and the telecast, 
therefore, was clearly a privileged subject. 
Id. 
136. 57 N.Y.2d 516, 443 N.E.2d 469, 457 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1982). 
137. Id. a t  519, 443 N.E.2d at 469-70, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  221-22. 
138. See id. at 520,443 N.E.2d a t  470, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  222. 
139. The writer often has been asked a t  seminars and lectures about the issue of liabii- 
ity for writing truthful, e.g., unflattering or negative, reference letters and for reporting in- 
competent professional practices to the State. Doctors, as a group, have a widespread per- 
ception that lawyers encourage the filiig of vexatious libel suits to deter the reporting of 
their client's unethical or dangerous practices. Whether true or not, the perception operates 
to inhibit those with the most information from speaking out. The writer feels that the 
Legislature should create a right to attorney's fees for the successful defendant in a libel 
action where the action is dismissed on grounds of qualified privilege. Such a step would 
free doctors from some of the fears which now restrain them from undertaking the role that 
public policy and common sense dictates they should play in policing their profession. 
140. 89 A.D.2d 164, 454 N.Y.S.2d 901 (2d Dep't 1982). 
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complaining about alleged illegal rent transactions concerning 
members of the tenants' association. The appellate division found 
that absolute immunity applied to the communications in ques- 
tion.141 The court found that all the considerations supporting ab- 
solute immunity for quasi-judicial proceedings apply to complaints 
before the State housing agen~y."~ The court recognized the role 
played by tenant leaders in this way: 
Assuming, as plaintiff alleges, that the complaints at  issue 
were authored by defendant in her capacity as tenant representa- 
tive we hold that they constituted a pertinent part of a quasi- 
judicial proceeding and were within the absolute immunity af- 
forded statements made therein . . . . 
The defendant, as president of Park Knoll Tenants Associa- 
tion, held a position consistent with that of many other concerned 
tenant association leaders throughout this State. Such persons are 
mostly unpaid, dedicated and energetic individuals who attempt 
to provide advice and disseminate information to tenants, who 
are sometimes of advanced age or suffer handicaps such as lan- 
guage difficulties, or who may be generally unfamiliar with their 
rights and remedies, so as to provide some counterbalance against 
the seeming omnipotence of their landlords. To rule against ex- 
tension of the absolute privilege to this defendant would un- 
doubtedly have a chilling effect upon any tenant representative 
whose counsel has been sought to assist a tenant in composing a 
formal complaint against a land10rd.l~~ 
Park Knoll Associates reflects, on its face, the defendant land- 
lord's attempt to stifle tenant protests through the pressure of libel 
law. The recognition of an absolute privilege for tenant leaders 
when communicating with state, and presumably also local, au- 
thorities responsible for tenant protection, is a major step forward 
in safeguarding tenant rights. This is a highly volatile area with an 
invariable imbalance of power and resources favoring the landlord. 
The Second Department's holding should be affirmed and ex- 
tended throughout the State. 
Libel can be accomplished pictorially as well as with words. A 
painting with the quixotic and engaging title "The Mugging of the 
141. See id. at  164-65, 454 N.Y.S.2d at  902-03. 
142. See id. at  174, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08. 
143. Id. at  175-76, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09 (citation omitted). 
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Muse" did not qualify as libelous in Silberman v. Georges.14' The 
trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed on the finding 
that the painting in question, rather than defaming the plaints, 
was "obviously allegorical and symbolic;" the picture expressed 
"critical opinion only at most.""6 
The Fourth Department, in Scacchetti v. Gannett Co., I~C.,"~ 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the de- 
fendant. A newspaper report had quoted the plaintiff, a police ser- 
geant, as voicing obscenities about the United States District 
Court judge who had just sentenced his brother. The supreme 
court granted s.ummary judgment on its own motion, finding that 
no cause of action had been stated. The appellate court applied the 
test that requires that an article be read as a whole. "Measured by 
these standards, the newspaper account concerning plaintiff can 
certainly be interpreted as subjecting him to public contempt, 
aversion or disgrace and tending to injure him in his profession as 
a law enforcement officer. The publication is thus arguably libelous 
per se.""? 
With New York City rental housing vacancies below the two 
per cent level, cooperative conversion campaigns have become bit- 
ter contests. It was inevitable, therefore, that allegations of libel in 
such a contest would reach the courts. The First Department, in 
Tanner & Gilbert v. Vern~,"~ reversed the trial court and dis- 
missed a law firm's libel complaint. The law firm, which repre- 
sented three tenants, alleged that it  had been libelled by a state- 
ment made by non-client tenants concerning the amount of its 
legal fees.*4s The court found that the firm, which had become in- 
volved in a bitter dispute, "made its conduct and its claim for legal 
fees an issue for discussion."160 Because the allegedly defamatory 
statements had been made only to other tenants interested in the 
dispute, a qualified privilege existed. 
144. 91 A.D.2d 520,456 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1st Dep't 1982) (rnem.). 
145. Id. at 521, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 396. 
146. 90 A.D.2d 985, 456 N.Y.S.2d 580 (4th Dep't 1982) (rnem.). 
147. Id. at 986, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 581. 
148. 92 A.D.2d 802, 460 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 1983) (mem.). 
149. Id. at 803,460 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The law firm sought over two million dollars in fees 
from both retained tenant-clients and non-clients who, the firm claimed, received a benefit 
from the firm's activities. In a related action, consolidated with this case on appeal, the First 
Department dismissed a suit for the fees brought by this law firm. 
150. Id. 
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Liability for libel was placed largely on the shoulders of a 
newspaper reporter in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.l6I The plain- 
tiff, who had never been a public figure or official, sued the Daily 
News, its publisher and editor, and a r e ~ 0 r t e r . l ~ ~  The reporter's 
article implied that the plaintiffs ex-husband became mentally ill 
partly because their son committed suicide knowing "his mother 
dated other men."16s As no negligence was established against ei- 
ther the editor or publisher, individual liability fell on the reporter 
whose actions were judged by the emerging standard of reasonable 
care for newspaper re~0r te rs . l~~ 
A diversity libel action, Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,lU6 
provides a lengthy digression on variant meanings of the term 
"mouthpiece" as applied to lawyers. The defendant had published 
an article concerning an investment made by "Frank Sinatra and a 
group . . . including his attorney, Milton R ~ d i n . " ' ~ ~  Rudin replied 
with a "letter to the editor" which the defendant published under 
the caption "SINATRA'S After reviewing 
psycholinguistic research, the court found that although the term 
"mouthpiece" connoted a negative image of lawyers, the plaintiff 
did not identify himself as an attorney in his letter to the editor 
and it was doubtful that readers would recall that plaintiff had 
been referred to as an attorney in the investment article published 
two months earlier.168 The general use of "mouthpiece" to describe 
a spokesperson was not, in the context of the evidence presented, 
defamatory.169 
D. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts 
The pirating and illegal production and distribution of re- 
corded music was the subject of the Court of Appeals decision in 
151. 115 Misc. 2d 483, 454 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). 
152. See id. a t  484, 488, 454 N.Y.S.2d a t  180, 183. 
153. Id. a t  483-84, 454 N.Y.S.2d a t  180. 
154. The court noted that with little effort, the reporter would have been aware that 
she had been given inaccurate information. See id. at 487, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 182. The stan- 
dard of care required in this case is hardly burdensome and little interference with ob- 
taining and publishing a newspaper story is created. 
155. 557 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
156. Id. a t  536 (quoting Barron's, Nov. 27, 1978, at 38). 
157. Id. (quoting Barron's, Jan. 15, 1979, at 7). 
158. See id. at 545. 
159. Id. a t  546. 
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Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc.lBO The specific issue was whether a 
cause of action accrued when the illegal appropriation began or at  
the time the defendant exploited the plaintifF's property. Stated 
otherwise, the Court of Appeals was asked to rescue the plaintiff 
from the consequences of not bringing an action in a timely man- 
ner because the appropriation allegedly began in 1965. 
The plaints  raised the theory that the defendant's action 
should be viewed as continuing trespasses, with a new three year 
statute of limitations accruing with each misuse of the recordings. 
The Court majority found that conversion had taken place in 1965 
and the plaints  was thus time-barred from prosecuting his claims. 
[I]t seems abundantly clear that plaintWs cause of action is one 
for conversion and not for trespass. The complaint alleges that 
although the plaintiff regained his rights to the master recording 
of "Get a Job" by operation of the oral agreement he had with 
Ember's president, the defendant, since 1965, has been using that 
master recording as his own by manufacturing, distributing and 
selling records and otherwise commercially exploiting that master 
recording which it is claimed is the property of the plaintiff. 
These allegations amount to more than mere interference. The 
conduct of the defendant certainly constituted a denial of both 
the plaintWs right to the master recording and a total usurping 
of plaintWs right to possess the master rec~rding.'~' 
Three members of the Court dissented claiming that 
[tlhe action, then, is not simply for misappropriation or conver- 
sion of the record, but for its repeated and continuing use there- 
after to manufacture and sell reproductions in violation of plain- 
tWs rights. Short of determining that there can be adverse 
possession of an intangible, . . . the complaint cannot be dis- 
missed as barred by lirnitation~.'~~ 
The Court of Appeals correctly decided this case. The plaintiff 
was aware of the misuse of the master recording in sufficient time 
to have begun an action. What he could not know, of course, was 
that someone would find the recording commercially attractive in 
succeeding years and would use it  for new albums. The measure of 
damages, had the action been brought at  the proper time, would 
160. 58 N.Y.2d 482, 448 N.E.2d 1324, 462 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1983). 
161. Id. at 488,448 N.E.2d at 1327, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 416. 
162. Id. at 490,448 N.E.2d at 1328, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
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probably be less than if the Court had accepted the continuing 
trespass theory. The defendant, however, by its clear exercise of 
dominion over the master recording in 1965 to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs rights, committed conversion and the cause of action ac- 
crued at  that point. 
An interesting diversity action considering New York fraud 
law was decided by the United States District Court for the South- 
ern District of New York in Idrees v. American University. 168 The 
plaintiff had resigned from a technician's position at a New York 
hospital to enroll at  a medical school in the British West Indies. 
Plaintiff Idrees claimed he was induced to enroll at  the defendant's 
school by an advertisement in the New York Times and by mate- 
rial that the school sent to him. He alleged fraud because, on regis- 
tering at the school, he found that both the faculty and the facili- 
ties promised were nonexistent.la 
The district court judge found that the defendant both inten- 
tionally and recklessly deceived applicants, including the plaintiff, 
and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages.ls6 Punitive dam- 
163. 546 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
164. Among the discrepancies between promise and reality were, as presented in plain- 
tiffs amended complaint: 
1. [Tlhe school had a library with periodicals, books and audio-visual aids. These 
representations were false as the library in fact had no periodicals, books or audio- 
visual aids. 
2. [The school] had laboratory facilities that included microscopes, microscopic 
slides and skeletons. These representations were false as there were no microscopes, 
microscopic slides or skeletons in the laboratory. 
3. [Flor the class in histology [each student] would be provided with a set of pre- 
pared slides and a microscope. These representations were false as he was not pro- 
vided with said slides or microscope. 
4. Defendant in [its bulletin] published a photograph identified as the Montserrat 
Hospital calculated to give plaintiff the impression that the hospital and the school 
had a relationship that would enable plaintiff and other students to use the facili- 
ties of said hospital. Plaintiff was in fact deceived by the publication of said photo- 
graph inasmuch as neither he nor other students were able to use any of the facili- 
ties of the hospital. 
5. [A] semester would consist of four classes commencing May 14,1980. Such repre- 
sentation was false as only two classes s k t e d  on that date. Defendant represented 
that the laboratory class would start on May 14,1980. Such representation was false 
as such class did not start until June 10, 1982. 
6. .The number of faculty members at the school was less than one-half of the num- 
ber represented by defendant. The courses in fact given were worthless and one was 
taught by a student enrolled at  the school at  that time. 
Id. at 1345 (quoting Plaintiffs complaint a t  11 3-7). 
165. See id. at  1350. 
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ages were, however, denied, with the court finding that the acts of 
the defendant fell below the standard required for the award of 
such damages under New York law.lae 
The writer believes the court erred seriously in not awarding 
punitive damages after ffirmatively finding multiple acts of decep- 
tion, all of which formed the basis for the plaintiffs decision to 
attend the defendant's school. The plaintiff moved to a foreign 
country and disrupted his life. He discovered that his dream of 
obtaining a real medical education was unrealizable. Of equal im- 
portance, public policy dictates that schools that deceive appli- 
cants and that promise to deliver quality medical instruction, but 
have no capability of so doing, are dangerous to public welfare. 
The plaintiffs compensatory damages were not great. No real de- 
terrent to the continued advertising of the defendant's school in 
New York emerges from the judgment. Punitive damages would or 
could have constituted a needed deterrent. 
New York courts were plagued last year, as every year, with 
attempts to frame otherwise unsustainable allegations within the 
prima facie tort category.Ia7 This cause of action, limited though it 
may be, will be deprived of all utility if counsel continue to allege 
it  as a matter of course and with no appreciation of its elements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The shape of New York tort law remained fairly constant dur- 
ing the past year. The only certain prognostication for next year's 
166. See id. a t  1351. The court relied upon Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 
N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961), for the punitive damage standard. According to  the 
Sheldon court, as noted in Idrees, see 546 F. Supp. a t  1351, 
[plunitive or exemplary damages have been allowed in cases where the wrong com- 
plained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not 
only to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others, who might other- 
wise be so prompted, from indulging in similar conduct in the future. 
10 N.Y.2d a t  404, 179 N.E.2d a t  499, 223 N.Y.S.2d a t  490. 
167. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 561 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Film- 
ways Pictures, Inc. v. Marks Polarized Corp., 552 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Greenfield 
v. Kanwit, 546 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Roberts v. Pollack, 92 A.D.2d 440, 461 
N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't 1983); Abelow v. Grossman, 91 A.D.2d 553, 457 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1st 
Dep't 1982) (rnem.); Wehringer v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 585,457 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1st 
Dep't 1982) (rnem.), aff'd mem., 59 N.Y.2d 688, 450 N.E.2d 223, 463 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1983); 
T.N.J. Holding v. Biaggi, Ehrlich & Lang, 90 A.D.2d 547,455 N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1982) 
(rnem.); Howard v. Block, 90 A.D.2d 455, 454 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1st Dep't 1982) (rnem.); 
Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1982). 
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Survey is that New York tort law will continue to reflect the evolv- 
ing standards of civil wrongs in this State. 
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